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SUMMARY
As a result of climate change, the Arctic region is 
undergoing dramatic transformation due to melting, 
which creates new challenges for international 
economic law. The Arctic coastal states began having 
maritime boundary disputes concerning the 
interpretation of limits of their exclusive economic 
zones beyond 200 nautical miles to cover the extended 
continental shelf. Thus, they would extend their 
sovereign rights over the natural resources of the sea 
floor causing an “ice-cold war” in the zone.
After an analysis of the Arctic legal governance, as well 
as of its economic activities like scientific research, 
energetic and fishing exploitation and shipping, it can 
be stated that a continental shelf race will not take 
place because of economic and security interests of 
states in the region, which can be solved efficiently on 
a basis of international cooperation. 
Key words: Arctic, climate change, fisheries, energy, 
transit
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1 InTRoducTIon
Climate change is causing melting in the Arc-
tic Ocean, which awoke international interest in 
the region owing to new economical challenges 
regarding scientific research, energetic and fish-
ing exploitation as well as new shipping routes. 
However, there is a fragment of international 
law regarding Arctic zone legal questions that 
the international community should solve first.
Accordingly, this paper analyzes the legal 
framework in the Arctic and the new economic 
activities that have emerged to understand its 
challenges in international economic law. Thus, 
the author has divided this paper into five sec-
tions. After this brief introduction, Section II 
explains the particular features of the Arctic 
Ocean; Section III studies the consequences of 
climate change in the economic activities of the 
Arctic region; Section IV examines the issue of 
sovereignty in the Arctic; and Section V con-
cludes with the key term of the Arctic zone: co-
operation.
2 specIal feaTuRes of THe 
aRcTIc ocean
2.1  geographical features: legal status of sea 
ice
The Arctic Ocean is the central part of the 
“marine Arctic”, which is a term used by the 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA)1 that 
involves Baffin, Hudson, and James Bays; the 
Labrador, greenland, Iceland, norwegian, and 
Bering Seas; and the Arctic Ocean.2 The area in-
cludes 3.5 million km² of cold, low-salinity sur-
face water and seasonal sea ice linked to the 
Arctic Ocean and some parts of the north At-
lantic and north Pacific Oceans. The main ba-
sins of the Arctic Ocean are eurasian and Cana-
dian (more than 4000m deep and landlocked). 
The total ocean region consists of 11.5 million 
km², being 60% thereof continental shelf.3 
1 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment: It is “an international 
project of the Arctic Council and the International Arctic 
Science Committee (IASC), to evaluate and synthesize 
knowledge on climate variability, climate change, and 
increased ultraviolet radiation and their consequences.”, 
available on the Internet at: <http://www.acia.uaf.edu> 
(visited 25 March 2013).
2 gordon McBean, Arctic Climate: Past and Present, Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment Scientific Report, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, pp. 21-60 at 26.
3 Ibid., at 26.
The main feature of the marine Arctic is its 
composition of sea ice as a unique biological 
habitat, which has a strong influence on climate 
change impacts due to its increasingly reduction 
over the years because of the global warming.4 It 
has two primary forms: seasonal ice (first-year 
ice) and perennial ice (multi-year ice).5 The 
former refers to the first winter of growth or first 
summer of melt, where the ice thickness reaches 
2.5 m in the high Arctic at the end of winter.6 
Thus, the first-year ice becomes multi-year ice 
after surviving the summer. This creates, over 
several years, ice floe without ridges almost salt-
free that can be 3 m thick at the end of winter.7 
Whereas the seasonal ice decreases from 15 mil-
lion km² in March to 7 million km² in Septem-
ber, the perennial ice is about 5 million km² and 
approximately 10% of Arctic sea ice exists 
through fram Strait (between greenland and 
the norwegian Archipelago Svalbard).8 This 
shows the sea ice’s physical dimensions to take 
into account when regulating.
Thereby, if the sea ice is the main character-
istic of the Arctic Ocean, what is the legal sta-
tus of sea ice under international law? The 
Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 (LOSC)9 
does not deal directly with the legal status of 
ice. Thus, Art.234 LOSC (provision that was 
negotiated between the United States, the So-
viet Union and Canada) simply refers to “ice-
covered areas” when regulating for the pre-
vention of pollution and safety of navigation 
in ice-covered areas within the exclusive eco-
nomic zone (eeZ), without specifying where 
the baselines for the eeZ are to be located.10 
4 John e. Walsh, Cryosphere and Hydrology, Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment, Scientific Report, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, pp. 183-242 at 189.
5 See McBean, above, at 30.
6 Ibid., at 30.
7 Ibid., at 30.
8 See McBean, above, at 30. The multilateral Svalbard Treaty 
of 1920 settled the territorial conflict between norway and 
the USSR. It granted norway sovereignty over the Svalbard 
archipelago conceding the mineral, industrial, and commercial 
rights to all signatory states.
9 The United States is not a contracting party of the LOSC.
10 Art.234 LOSC: “Coastal States have the right to adopt 
and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from 
vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive 
economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions 
and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year 
create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and 
pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm 
to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such 
laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment 
based on the best available scientific evidence.”
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Since the 1960s, the United States (US) and 
the Soviet Union (USSR) could navigate un-
der the ice with nuclear-powered submarines11 
and Canada saw its sovereignty claims in the 
area of the northwest Passage covered by 
means of the sector theory (division of the 
Arctic into sectors measured by meridians of 
longitude),12 which influenced defining this 
part of the law. However, it is interesting to 
note that Art.234 LOSC explicitly reads “ice-
covered areas within the limits of the exclusive 
economic zone”. This implies for some that 
the Article refers to floating ice, which a state 
cannot claim because it is located within the 
eeZ.13 If ice is equated to land, it would gen-
erate a territorial sea and, therefore, it could 
not be inside of the eeZ.14 Since Art.234 
LOSC explicitly mentions “ice within the 
eeZ”, it is clear that pack ice cannot be 
claimed. 
In that way, one problem to claim that ice 
can generate territorial sea baselines, unlike 
land, is its transitory nature. even though 
Art.7(2) LOSC15 deals with unstable coasts, it 
must be read in the light of paragraph 1 of the 
11 Michael Byers, Who owns the Arctic? Understanding 
Sovereignty Disputes in the North, Douglas & McIntyre 
Publishers Inc., Canada, 2010, at 75: “nuclear-powered 
submarines do not require oxygen for propulsion and are 
therefore not dependent on the surface of the water being free 
of ice. […] Canada never possessed a submarine that could 
travel under the ice.” 
12 Stuart B. Kaye, Territorial Sea Baselines Along Ice Covered 
Coasts: International Practice and Limits of the Law of the Sea, 
Ocean Development & International Law, volume 35, issue 1, 
2004, pp.75-102 at 79.
The sector theory to Arctic waters has never been accepted 
internationally.
 Ivan L. Head, Canadian claims to territorial sovereignty in the 
Arctic regions, Mcgill Law Journal, vol.9, no.3, 1963, pp. 200-
226 at 202-203: “An Arctic sector […] is compounded of only 
two ingredients: a base line or arc described along the Arctic 
Circle through territory unquestionably within the jurisdiction 
of a temperate zone state, and sides defined by meridians of 
longitude extending from the north Pole south to the most 
easterly and westerly points on the Arctic Circle pierced by the 
state. Under the theory, nations possessing territory extending 
into the Arctic regions have a rightful claim to all territory - be 
it land, water or ice - lying to their north. This claim springs 
from the geographical relationship of the claimant state to the 
claimed territory; the two areas must be contiguous along the 
Arctic Circle.”
13 See Kaye, above, at 79.
14 CC. Joyner, Ice-covered regions in international law, natural 
resources journal, volume 31(1), 1991, pp.213-242 at 220-229.
15 Art.7(2) LOSC: “Where because of the presence of a delta 
and other natural conditions the coastline is highly unstable, 
the appropriate points may be selected along the furthest 
seaward extent of the low-water line and, notwithstanding 
subsequent regression of the low-water line, the straight 
baselines shall remain effective until changed by the coastal 
State in accordance with this Convention.”
same Article,16 which only applies “where the 
coastline is deeply indented or cut into, or if 
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its 
immediate vicinity” and it is limited to deltas.17 
nevertheless, there is no common agreement, 
and the majority opinion among international 
publicists is that when ice has permanent char-
acter it should be treated as land or as sui 
generis capable of generating territorial sea 
baselines.18 In the latter case, the preferred 
methods for determining the baselines are ei-
ther to use an average of known sea fronts of 
the ice or the mentioned unstable coast legal 
provision of At.7 LOSC.19
2.2 arctic legal governance
The geopolitical and geostrategic relevance 
of the Arctic lies in its special geographical lo-
cation because it adjoins three continents: 
America, europe and Asia. Hence, if one state 
possesses a portion thereof the direct conse-
quence would be the control of new aerial and 
maritime routes. 
There are several international conventions 
that entered into force for the five Arctic coast-
al states, which regulate different economic ac-
tivities at sea. Consequently, in the Arctic: the 
geneva Maritime Conventions of 1958 –Con-
vention on the High Seas, Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, Convention on fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas and Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone-; the Convention 
on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and other Matters of 1972; 
International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships of 1973; or the Un Strad-
dling fish Stock Agreement of 1995.
even though LOSC is a fundamental multi-
lateral convention that codifies the law of the 
sea, pursuant to Art.311(1) LOSC, the “Con-
vention shall prevail, as between States Parties, 
over the geneva Conventions on the Law of 
the Sea of 29 April 1958”. It only totally applies 
to four of the five coastal Arctic states, because 
16 Art.7(1) LOSC: “In localities where the coastline is deeply 
indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along 
the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight 
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in 
drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea is measured.”
17 See Kaye, above, at 95.
18 Ibid., at 97.
19 See Kaye, above, at 97.
the United States is not a part thereof, nor of 
the UnCLOS20 Implementation Agreement of 
1994. Hence, as regards the five Arctic coastal 
states, the geneva Maritime Conventions of 
1958 and the customary Arctic regional law 
wholly govern the Arctic Ocean. In this regard, 
it is noteworthy that regional, bilateral, and na-
tional agreements have created international 
customary law on the Arctic.21 These treaties 
include: the legislative and treaty practice of 
Tsarit Russia, the USSR and Russia in the Arc-
tic; the legislative and treaty practice of Canada 
in the Arctic; relevant laws and treaty practice 
of other Arctic coastal states; and acquiescence 
with such practices from the majority of the 
states from the 15th to 20th centuries, together 
with the absence of relevant persistent objec-
tors.22 Some authors consider, therefore, that 
relevant opinio juris has been formed regarding 
those practices in the Arctic.23
nevertheless, LOSC also governs the Arctic 
Ocean concerning the principles of general in-
ternational law,24 which several declarations 
have confirmed, e.g. the Ilulissat Declaration on 
28 May 200825 or the Tromsø Declaration on 29 
April 2009.26 Thereby, if the Arctic27 is consid-
ered a semi-enclosed sea,28 it is subject to 
20 UnCLOS: United Convention on the Law of the Sea.
21 Alexander n. Vylegzhanin, “economic Activities in the 
Arctic Ocean – Universal, Regional and national Regulation”, 
in Cécile Pelaudeix, Alain faure & Robert griffiths (eds.): 
What holds the Arctic together?, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2012, pp. 
137-150 at 144.
22 See Vylegzhanin, above, at 145.
23 Ibid., at 148.
24 There are some legal provisions of LOSC that are not 
considered by the US as part of customary international law.
25 The Ilulissat Declaration, adopted by Canada, Denmark, 
norway, the Russian federation and the United States of 
America at the Arctic Ocean Conference in greenland: 
“notably, the law of the sea provides for important rights 
and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer 
limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine 
environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of 
navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the 
sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the 
orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.”, p.1.
26 Tromsø Declaration, adopted by the eight Arctic states 
in norway: “Recalling that an extensive legal framework 
applies to the Arctic Ocean including, notably, the law of the 
sea, and that this framework provides a solid foundation for 
responsible management of this ocean.”, p.1.
27 The Arctic consists of the Arctic Ocean and parts of 
Canada, Russia, Denmark (greenland), norway, The United 
States (Alaska), Sweden, finland and Iceland.
28 Art.122 LOSC: “for the purposes of this Convention, 
“enclosed or semi-enclosed sea” means a gulf, basin or sea 
surrounded by two or more States and connected to another 
sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or 
primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones 
of two or more coastal States.”
Art.123 LOSC, which requires cooperation 
among bordering states in a scientific research. 
Other multilateral and regional agreements on 
specific issues apply to the Arctic, such as the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) or the 
Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears 
(1973) respectively. In addition, scientific impor-
tant organizations for the Arctic are the Interna-
tional Council for the exploration of the Sea 
(ICeS), the International Arctic Science Com-
mittee (IASC) and the european Polar Board.29 
even though there is not an Arctic Treaty, 
unlike the Antarctica,30 it is remarkable that the 
Arctic states cooperate within the Arctic Coun-
cil (AC)31 signing several declarations32 to col-
laborate and to establish Arctic governance. 
The Arctic Council, which the 1991 Arctic en-
vironmental Protection Strategy (AePS)33 pre-
ceded and established by the non-binding docu-
ment Ottawa Declaration (1996), does not have 
a permanent secretariat. The AC was divided 
into two groups, namely A5 and A8. The group 
A8 represents the original structure of the 
AePS and later of the AC, i.e., Canada, Den-
mark, finland, Iceland, norway, Russia, Swe-
den and the United States. The A5 consists of 
the inner coastal states (sanctum), which are in-
creasingly considered the states with legitimacy 
to act in the region under international law, i.e., 
Canada, Denmark, norway, Russia and the 
United States.34 However, due to its relevance 
29 Yoshinobu Takei, Polar Complications in the Law of the Sea: 
A Case Study of the Regime for Research and 
 Survey Activities in the Arctic Ocean, (Presentation given 
at the Sixth ABLOS Conference “Contentious Issues in 
UnCLOS – Surely not?”, International Hydrographic 
Bureau, Principality of Monaco, 25-27 October 2010, p.3.).
30 The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) of 1961, with 50 
signatory states, regulates international relations concerning 
the Antarctica. nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that, 
whereas the Antarctic is a continent surrounded by an Ocean 
that remains res nullius, the Arctic is an Ocean surrounded by 
inhabited territories.
31 The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum 
to promote cooperation, coordination and interaction among 
the Arctic States. 
32 Arctic Declarations: Ottawa Declaration (1996), Iqaluit 
Declaration (1998), Barrow Declaration (2000), Inari 
Declaration (2002), Reykjavik Declaration (2004), Salekhard 
Declaration (2006), Tromsø Declaration (2009) and nuuk 
Declaration (2011).
33 Before the beginning of the negotiations for the AePS 
in 1989 the Arctic was not intended to be a place for inter-
governmental cooperation because of the relations between 
the two super powers of the Cold War. finally, the AePS was 
adopted by the eight Arctic states in 1991 to protect the Arctic 
ecosystem.
34 Heather n. nicol, Human Security, the Arctic Council and 
Climate Change: Competition or Co-existence?, Polar Record, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 1-6 at 3.
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in the Arctic governance, there are powerful 
states that want to have the observer status into 
the Council, such as China, South Korea or the 
entity of the european Union (eU).35 In par-
ticular, because of the navigational and fisher-
ies interests of the eU in the Arctic region,36 it 
would be important for the eU to achieve a 
more inclusive governance arrangement for the 
Arctic.37 However, on 29th April 2009 the AC 
rejected the european Union’s application for 
observer status. The Inuit Circumpolar Council 
(ICC),38 by the eU and by the US, supports the 
idea of improving the role of the Arctic Coun-
cil; nevertheless, nowadays the creation of an 
Arctic Treaty in the same line as the Antarctic 
Treaty System is unlikely, which the future evo-
lution of the Arctic Council compensates.39 
Thus, in the absence of an Arctic Treaty, on 12th 
May 2011 the Member states of the AC signed 
the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronauti-
cal and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), 
which is the first binding agreement negotiated 
within the AC.
Moreover, the International Maritime Or-
ganization (IMO) adopted on 2nd December 
2009 the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters (A 26/Res.1024), based on the Guide-
lines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered 
Waters (MSC/Circ.506) of 2002. The 2009 
guidelines are not-binding because they have a 
recommendatory character and apply to both 
the Antarctica and the Arctic. They (A 26/
Rs.1024) consider the climatic conditions of 
Polar waters to meet appropriate standards of 
maritime safety and pollution prevention,40 bas-
ing their damage stability provisions on the re-
vised chapter II.1 of the International Conven-
tion for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) of 
1974. Thus, they apply until the adoption of the 
35 Timo Koivurova, Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic 
Council in a rapidly changing scene of Arctic Governance, Polar 
Record 46 (237), Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 146–
156 at 149. 
36 There are three eU-member states that are Arctic states: 
Denmark, finland and Sweden. In addition, Iceland has 
applied for eU membership
37 See Koivurova, above, at 152.
38 The ICC is a multilateral non-governmental organization 
and Indigenous Peoples’ Organization representing the Inuit 
people, with status of Permanent Participant on the Arctic 
Council.
39 See Koivurova, above, at 152.
40 IMO, Media Centre: “Shipping in Polar Waters - 
Development of an international code of safety for ships 
operating in Polar waters (Polar Code)”, available on the 
Internet at: <http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/hottopics/
polar/Pages/default.aspx> (visited 16 April 2013).
Polar Code, which will have a mandatory char-
acter and a much more precise spatial defini-
tion. The Polar Code will also have a specific 
description of the features of both Polar Re-
gions; it would cover the full range of design, 
construction, equipment, operational, training, 
search and rescue and environmental protec-
tion, matters relevant to ships operating in the 
waters of the two poles.41 As a result, a glo-
balized Polar legal framework that regulates se-
curity for ships operating in polar waters.
3 clIMaTe cHange In THe 
aRcTIc – cHallenges In 
InTeRnaTIonal econoMIc 
laW
Climate change, which was recognized as an 
unquestionable reality by the IPCC42 fourth 
Assessment Report in 2007, could be qualified 
as the main threat for the Arctic because it 
causes the fast disappearance of its layer of ice 
from summer to summer. According to scien-
tists, the Arctic could loss its sea-ice in 10 or 20 
years, which would mean an increase of the 
heat absorption of solar radiation by the earth 
and consequently the liberation of high levels 
of greenhouse gas emissions.43 
Thus, the thermohaline circulation of the 
ocean affects global climate, which transports 
heat via a poleward flow of warm surface water 
and an equatorward return of cold, less saline 
water at depth.44 The frequency and intensity of 
overturning influence the density of water at 
the surface, which affects the outflow of low-sa-
linity water from the Arctic. An increase in the 
Arctic outflow reduces the overturning and, 
consequently, the oceanic flux of heat, resulting 
in the elimination of atmospheric CO² to the 
deep ocean.45
There is a clear relationship between atmos-
pheric temperature increases (with high levels 
of CO²) and sea ice extent. Sea ice, as the fun-
41 Ibid.
42 The IPCC is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change established by the United nations to provide 
comprehensive scientific assessments about the risks of 
climate change.
43 greenpeace: “el Ártico y los efectos del cambio climático 
en españa – Salvar el Ártico es salvar mucho más”, March 
2013, pp. 1-32 at 5. 
44 See McBean, above, at 32.
45 Ibid., at 33.
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damental feature of the marine Arctic, is sensi-
tive to climate change because it reflects solar 
radiation and insulates the ocean waters against 
loss of heat and moisture, particularly during 
winter.46 Accordingly, if there is a thermal ex-
pansion of ocean waters in the Arctic, this re-
sults in an increase of the sea levels in the At-
lantic and the Pacific through Bering Strait, 
fram Strait and the Canadian Archipelago, 
which affects ecosystems and communities near 
coastlines and has effects in the whole world.47
To avoid this situation, the Durban Climate 
Change Conference of 2011 agreed to launch a 
new platform of negotiations under the Un 
Climate Change Convention (UnCCC) to cre-
ate a new and universal greenhouse gas reduc-
tion protocol with legal force by 2015 for the 
period beyond 2020.48 In addition, the melting 
of sea ice increases the panorama of resource 
exploration in the Arctic, which represents a 
challenge for international economic law. The 
next sections will analyze the main areas affect-
ed. 
3.1 scientific research
Part XIII of LOSC and other relevant provi-
sions, thereof, constitute the legal framework 
for marine scientific research activities.49 
Art.239 LOSC, which provides the promotion 
and facilitation of marine scientific research,50 
forms the basis for some international legal in-
struments that refer the relevance of scientific 
research in the Arctic Ocean The agreements 
referred include: the Agreement on the Con-
servation of Polar Bears, Article VII; Declara-
tion on the establishment of the Arctic Coun-
cil, preamble, para.5; Agreement between 
Canada and the United States of America on 
Arctic Cooperation (Ottawa, 11 January 1988), 
para.3; Agreement between the Denmark and 
Canada for Cooperation Relating to the Ma-
rine environment (Copenhagen, 26 August 
46 See McBean, above, at 33.
47 Ibid., at 33.
48 United nations framework Convention on Climate 
Change: “Durban – Towards full implementation of the Un 
Climate Change Convention”, available on the Internet at: 
<http://unfccc.int/key_steps/durban_outcomes/items/6825.
php> (visited 3 April 2013).
49 In particular there are remarkable LOSC Articles 19(2), 
21(1), 40, 87, 143, 245-246 and 256-257.
50 Art.239 LOSC: “States and competent international 
organizations shall promote and facilitate the development 
and conduct of marine scientific research in accordance with 
this Convention.”
1983), Article VI. The relevance of scientific re-
search is also a prerequisite to apply Art.234 
LOSC, whose last sentence states: “[s]uch laws 
and regulations shall have due regard to navi-
gation and the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment based on the best avail-
able scientific evidence.”
However, LOSC does not define “marine sci-
entific research”, which is problematic because 
not all types of researches are unanimously 
considered “marine scientific research”. This is 
the particular case of “hydrographic surveys”.51 
Thus, LOSC does not provide the right to con-
duct hydrographic surveys for ships either dur-
ing the right of innocent passage in territorial 
waters, the eeZ or the high seas. To solve the 
controversy, it could be argued that, based on 
Art.87(1)(f) LOSC,52 hydrographic surveys 
could be considered as a form of survey activi-
ties or scientific research in the high seas. In the 
same line, the freedom of scientific research in 
the high seas, and, therefore, of hydrographic 
surveys, could be applied to the eeZ in the 
light of Art.58(1) LOSC53 and Art.58(2) LO-
SC.54 On the contrary, other scholars are of the 
opinion that hydrographic surveys in the eeZ 
of another state shall be performed with the ex-
press consent of the coastal state.55
51 Yoshinobu Takei, Polar Complications in the Law of the Sea: 
A Case Study of the Regime for Research and Survey Activities 
in the Arctic Ocean, (Presentation given at the Sixth ABLOS 
Conference “Contentious Issues in UnCLOS – Surely not?”, 
International Hydrographic Bureau, Principality of Monaco, 
25-27 October 2010, p.4.). To read more about the concept 
of “hydrographic surveys” see: Advisory Board on Law of the 
Sea (ABLOS), “A Manual on Technical Aspects of the United 
nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – 1982”, Special 
Publication no. 51, 4th edition (2006), at Chapter 1, pp. 7-8.
52 Art.87(1)(f) LOSC: “freedom of scientific research, subject 
to Parts VI and XIII.”
53 Art.58(1) LOSC: “In the exclusive economic zone, all States, 
whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant 
provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 
87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine 
cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of 
the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated 
with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and 
pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this 
Convention.”
54 See Takei, above, at 4.
 See Art.58(2) LOSC: “Articles 88 to 115 and other 
pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive 
economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this 
Part.”
55 Ocean Policy Research foundation, eeZ group 21, 
“guidelines for navigation and Overflight in the exclusive 
economic Zone” (2005), at Article IX(a), first sentence: 
“Hydrographic surveying should only be conducted in the 
eeZ of another state with the consent of the coastal state.”
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The obligation to preserve and to protect the 
marine environment by virtue of Part XII 
LOSC also affects scientific research. even 
though there is no particular reference to the 
Arctic in LOSC, the majority opinion states 
that the drafters of LOSC had in mind the Arc-
tic Ocean while drafting Art.234 LOSC (ice-
covered seas).56 Art.234 LOSC refers to “non-
discriminatory laws or regulations” for the 
protection of marine environment within the 
limits of the eeZ in ice-covered areas, but it 
does not mention international standards. As a 
result, states may have stricter regulations in 
their eeZ of the Arctic area.57 Thereby, unless 
national laws indicate the opposite, research 
vessels would be covered by this Article as a 
type of “vessels”.58 
Assuming hydrographic surveys are governed 
by a different regime from marine scientific re-
searches, the question now is whether hydro-
graphic surveys can be regulated by coastal 
states within their eeZ by virtue of Art.234 
LOSC, which mention the notion of “pollution 
of the marine environment”. This concept is 
defined broadly by Art.1(1)(4) LOSC as fol-
lows: “the introduction by man […] of sub-
stances or energy into the marine environment, 
including estuaries, which results or is likely to 
result in such deleterious effects as harm to liv-
ing resources and marine life, hazards to hu-
man health [or] to marine activities […].” Thus, 
if seismic surveys impact marine mammals, it 
could be affirmed that hydrographic surveys 
might fall within the definition of “pollution of 
marine environment” and consequently, coastal 
states may regulate such activities within their 
eeZ under Art.234 LOSC.59
3.2 energetic exploitation – energy efficiency 
and security
The rapid melting in the Arctic as the result 
of climate change allows the passage of ships 
56 S. Rosenne, & A. Yankov (eds.), United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary (Virginia 
Commentary), vol. IV (1991), at pp. 392-398.
57 A. Chircop, The Growth of International Shipping in the 
Arctic: Is a Regulatory Review Timely?, 24 International Journal 
of Marine and Coastal Law (2009), at pp. 369-370.
58 See Takei, above, at 6.
59 Ibid., at 6. 
The impacts of seismic testing on marine mammals were 
discussed in the case in the nunavut Court of Justice in 
Canada: Qikiqtani Inuit Association vs. Canada (Minister of 
Natural Resources), nunavut Court of Justice, Judgment of 8 
August 2010, 2010 nUCJ 12.
through new routes available for transit during 
the summer and makes the oil and gas deposits 
under the Arctic seabed much easier to access, 
which benefits oil companies to explore the 
Arctic and to exploit the potential oil and gas 
bourses. In this sense, the US geological Sur-
vey (USgS) estimates the energetic reserves in 
the Arctic as follows: 90 billion barrels of oil, 
1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 
billion barrels of natural gas liquids, of which 
about 84% is expected to be found in the off-
shore areas.60 This is enough to meet global de-
mands approximately for three years.61
LOSC is the global convention that establish-
es the rights and obligations of coastal states to 
regulate oil and gas exploration and production 
in their eeZ and on their continental shelf,62 as 
well as to protect the marine environment con-
trolling pollution form devices, such as oil rigs 
in order to keep energy security. Pursuant to 
Art.58(1) LOSC, in the eeZ other states, dif-
ferent from the involved coastal states, enjoy 
the freedom of navigation and the right to lay 
submarine cables and pipelines. This is impor-
tant because until now LOSC is the only multi-
lateral convention accepted by the Arctic states 
to regulate their relationships.
The Tromsø Declaration (2009) is an instru-
ment that publishes the working goals of the 
Arctic Council for present and in the future. 
Thus, it decided “to strengthen cooperation on 
prevention of, and response to accidental spills 
of oil and hazardous substances in the Arctic”, 
based on the legal provisions: “protection of 
the marine environment” of Art.145 LOSC, on 
the general obligation of Art.192 LOSC to pro-
tect the marine environment and on Art.197 
LOSC.63 In addition, the Declaration bases its 
arguments regarding energy on the “Un envi-
ronment Programme” (UneP). It urges mem-
60 Peter H. Stauffer, Circum-Arctic Ressource Appraisal – 
Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic 
Circle, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal Assessment Team, 
USgS fact Sheet 2008-3049, 2008, available on the Internet 
at: <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf> 
(visited 3 April 2013).
61 See Byers, above, at 10.
62 See Articles 56, 60, 81 and 193 of LOSC.
63 Art.192 LOSC: “States have the obligation to protect and 
preserve the marine environment.”
 Art.197 LOSC: “States shall cooperate on a global basis 
and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through 
competent international organizations, in formulating and 
elaborating international rules, standards and recommended 
practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, 
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, 
taking into account characteristic regional features.”
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ber states to apply the precautionary approach 
of Principles 15 and 16 of the Rio Declaration 
(1992), as well as to conduct environmental as-
sessment for “exploration, development, trans-
port and storage of oil”.64 In addition, it recog-
nizes the potential of “energy efficiency”, which 
was a concept developed in the Un Conference 
on Sustainable Development (UnCSD) of 
2012 - the so called “Rio+20” -,65 in the Arctic 
region via renewable energy resources as a 
unique development opportunity. 
In this regard, it is interesting to note that 
the UnCSD discussed the concept of “green 
economy”,66 which is fundamental for “energy 
efficiency”. energy is the main contributor to 
climate change because it accounts for around 
60% of greenhouse gas emissions. Hence, the 
reduction of carbon intensity of energy is fun-
damental for long-term climate goals. This can 
be achieved through “energy transition”, which 
means the transition to sustainable economy by 
64 United nations environment Programme (UneP), 
environment for Development: “Rio Declaration on 
environment and Development”, 3-14 June 1992, available 
on the Internet at: <http://www.unep.org/documents.
multilingual/default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163> 
(visited 4 April 2013):
Principle 15: “In order to protect the environment, the 
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
 Principle 16: “national authorities should endeavour 
to promote the internalization of environmental costs and 
the use of economic instruments, taking into account the 
approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost 
of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without 
distorting international trade and investment.”
65 energy efficiency is developed by paragraphs 128, 129 and 
136 of the Un general Assembly Resolution 66/288, “The 
future We Want” (Zero Draft of the Outcome Document of 
the Conference “Rio+20”), as a result of the “Rio+20” Un 
Conference on Sustainable Development, 20-22 June 2012. 
More accurate is the initiative by the Secretary general on 
“Sustainable energy for All”, that focuses on access to energy, 
energy efficiency and renewable energies. This initiative is 
considered to be launched by para.136 of the agreement 
“The future We Want” to make “sustainable energy for all 
a reality, and through this, help eradicate poverty and lead to 
sustainable development and global prosperity.”
66 “green economy” focus the concept not only on 
environment, but also on social aspects:
 Definition by the UneP: “economy that results 
in improved human well-being and social equity, while 
significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological 
scarcities.”
 Definition by gA Res. 66/288: “green economy should 
contribute to eradicating poverty as well as sustained economic 
growth, enhancing social inclusion, improving human welfare 
and creating opportunities for employment and decent work 
for all, while maintaining the healthy functioning of the 
earth’s ecosystems.”
means of renewable energy, energy efficiency 
and sustainable development. The author 
draws attention to the fact that “energy effi-
ciency”, which is one of the goals of the Arctic 
Council set up in the Tromsø Declaration, is a 
key part thereof.
furthermore, the Tromsø Declaration ap-
proves “the revised Arctic Council Offshore Oil 
and gas guidelines [29 April 2009] and urges all 
States to apply these guidelines throughout the 
Arctic as minimum standards in national regula-
tions to keep energy security.” These guidelines 
“are intended to be of use to the Arctic nations 
for offshore oil and gas activities during plan-
ning, exploration, development, production and 
decommissioning.” (the first paragraph of the 
guidelines’ purpose). They establish four gener-
al principles, some of which the Principles of the 
Rio Declaration form the basis:67 Principles of 
the precautionary approach (Principle 15 of the 
Rio Declaration); Polluter pays Principle (Prin-
ciple 16 of the Rio Declaration); Principle of 
continuous improvement; and Principle of sus-
tainable development.
Linking the UneP mechanisms with the 
Arctic Council instruments, the Tromsø Decla-
ration fosters the protection of the Arctic ma-
rine environment, not only founded on the ba-
sic LOSC legal provisions, but on a higher level. 
This is very important to achieve energy effi-
ciency in the Arctic, taking into account its rel-
evance in the climate change. 
3.3 fishing exploitation – fisheries subsidies
During the past decades the ice floe in the 
Arctic was a de facto natural marine reserve for 
fishing; local fishermen were fishing in a sus-
tainable way over the years. In fact, regional 
and bilateral agreements cover fishery activities 
in the Arctic seas, such as the 1980 north-east 
Atlantic fisheries Convention or the norwe-
gian-Russian federation fisheries Commis-
sion. However, with melting ice new fishing-
grounds appear and, consequently, industrial 
fishing fleets start to exploit the marine re-
67 Paragraph 17 of the “The future We Want” recognizes 
“the importance of the three Rio Conventions to advancing 
sustainable development and in this regard we urge all 
Parties to fully implement their commitments under the 
United nations framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UnfCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
and the United nations Convention to Combat Desertification 
(UnCCD), in accordance with their respective principles and 
provisions.”
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sources of the Arctic Ocean, which affects the 
local ecosystems because of the risk of overex-
ploiting.
Coastal states have sovereignty over fishing 
resources within their own eeZ; nevertheless, 
this is not the case for the high seas. In this 
sense, Art.87 LOSC68 applies the freedoms of 
the high seas to “all parts of the sea that are not 
included in the exclusive economic zone, in the 
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, 
or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic 
State.” (Art.86 LOSC), establishing an open ac-
cess regime. Thus, Art.87(1)(e) LOSC sets up 
the freedom of fishing, which is supported by 
Art.116 LOSC (“right to fish on the high seas”), 
which could be understood as a potential prob-
lem for overexploitation of fishing resources, es-
pecially in the area of the Arctic Ocean (at the 
centre of the Arctic Ocean) that does not fall 
within the maritime boundaries of any coastal 
state. To solve this, it is important to mention 
Articles 118 and 119 LOSC, which impose the 
obligation on states to cooperate in the conser-
vation of marine living resources as well as the 
possibility to go to arbitration in case of violation 
of regional or sectoral agreements.69 These legal 
provisions protect the conservation of fisheries 
in the high seas. In addition, the five Arctic 
coastal states signed the United nations fish 
Stocks Agreement of 1995 to complete LOSC 
regarding responsible fisheries in the high seas.70
In relation to overfishing of Arctic fish 
stocks, it is fundamental to eliminate harmful 
fishing subsidies to fleets71 because it increases 
68 Art.87 LOSC: The freedom of the high seas includes, inter 
alia: “(a) freedom of navigation; (b) freedom of overflight; 
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to 
Part VI; (d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other 
installations permitted under international law, subject to Part 
VI; (e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down 
in section 2; (f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts 
VI and XIII.”
69 See Art.188 LOSC, Annex VII LOSC and Annex VIII 
LOSC
70 A/COnf.164/37, Objective of the Convention – Art.2: “to 
ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks through 
effective implementation of the relevant provisions of the 
Convention.” See the general principles of the Convention 
established by Art.5 thereof.
71 gRID-Arendal, Publications: “The environment Times – 
Arctic Times”, August 2002, p.15, available on the Internet 
at: <http://www.grida.no/publications/et/at/> (visited 8 April 
2013).
 gRID-Arendal is a centre based in norway since 1989 
that collaborates with the Un environmental Programme 
communicating environmental information and facilitating 
environmental decision-making.
their fishing capacity causing that ships can fish 
longer, harder and further away exhausting ma-
rine living resources.72 This can be shown, for 
instance, with the case of migratory fish species, 
where subsidized fleets can adapt itself for fish-
ing better -increasing their trade expectations- 
than those fleets that are not subsidized. Since 
fisheries subsidies are a generalized practice in 
the global economy, the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) launched at the Doha Ministerial 
Conference negotiations to improve WTO dis-
ciplines on fisheries subsidies. These negotia-
tions were intensified in 2005 at the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference73 as an Annex to the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures (SCM), the Annex VIII. Al-
beit subsidies have an unquestionable econom-
ic dimension because they are mechanisms that 
may distort trade,74 they were included into the 
WTO negotiations because of their negative 
environmental impact concerning fishing over-
exploitation.75 In this sense, a specific regula-
tion within the WTO SCM legal framework is 
necessary because the SCM focus on subsidies 
with regard to trade distortions and it does not 
deal with economic problems within the pro-
ductive area.76
Thus, the draft of Annex VIII to the SCM 
(“fisheries Subsidies”) sets up in Art.1 the pro-
hibition of certain harmful fisheries subsidies 
that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, 
inter alia: (1) subsidies conferred on the acqui-
sition, construction, repair, renewal, renova-
72 WTO Website: Introduction to fisheries subsidies in the 
WTO: “The food and Agriculture Organization (fAO) of the 
United nations reports that 80 per cent of world fish stocks 
are either fully exploited or overexploited”, available on the 
Internet at: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/
fish_e/fish_intro_e.htm> (visited 8 April 2013).
73 WT/MIn(05)/DeC, Annex D, paragraph 9 : “the group 
should strengthen disciplines on subsidies in the fisheries 
sector, including through the prohibition of certain forms of 
fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and over-
fishing [...] special and differential treatment for developing 
and least-developed Members should be an integral part of 
the fisheries subsidies negotiations.”
74 See Art.1(1) SCM, which defines a subsidy as a financial 
contribution by a government or a public body conferring 
a benefit; and Art.2 SCM, which provides that only specific 
subsidies are subject to the SCM Agreement.
75 Carlos Teijo garcía, “el desarrollo progresivo de las 
normas sobre subvenciones pesqueras en el Derecho de la 
OMC – Una aproximación a la conservación de los recursos 
pesqueros desde la perspectiva del Derecho internacional 
del comercio”, in: Julio Jorge Urbina, & María Teresa Ponte 
Iglesias (eds) Protección de intereses colectivos en el Derecho 
del mar y cooperación internacional, Iustel, Madrid, 2012, pp. 
109-140 at 112.
76 See Teijo garcía, above, at 114.
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tion, modernization of fishing vessels, (2) subsi-
dies conferred on operating costs of fishing 
including fuel, (3) subsidies in respect of port 
infrastructure, (4) income support to fisher-
men, and (5) price support for fisheries prod-
ucts.77 At the same time, Art.2 of Annex VIII 
establishes general exceptions for those fisher-
ies subsidies that can be useful, inter alia, to im-
prove fishing or service vessel; to adopt envi-
ronmentally friendly technologies; or for 
re-education, retraining and redeployment of 
fish-workers when fisheries activities are not 
sustainable anymore in a particular region.78 
On the grounds of the negotiations at the Hong 
Kong Conference of 2005, Art.III of the Annex 
VIII applies special and differential treatment 
of developing country Members establishing, 
inter alia, more exceptions for developing coun-
try Members, such as exceptions for inshore 
fishery, and the exception that least-developed 
country Members are not subject to these pro-
hibitions. These legal provisions are very im-
portant for the inshore fishery practiced by the 
indigenous populations that habit the Arctic, 
such as the Inuits. It is interesting to add that 
Annex VIII provides in Art.VIII a specific dis-
pute settlement procedure for fishery.
However, negotiations on fishery subsidies 
are at present in a deadlock mainly because of 
different interests concerning the scope of pro-
hibitions on subsidies as well as the special and 
differential treatment on developing country 
Members.79 Thus, a possibility to get going 
again would be to focus negotiations on inter-
national regulation of subsidies over fisheries 
77 Tn/RL/W/213, 30 november 2007, Annex VIII, Art.1. 
 nakagawa, Junji: “Doha negotiation on fisheries 
Subsidies”, International economic Law and Policy Blog, 
19 October 2008, available on the Internet at: <http://
worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2008/10/doha-
negotiatio.html> (visited 8 April 2013).
78 Tn/RL/W/213, 30 november 2007, Annex VIII, Art.2.
79 WTO Website, forum: “fishing Subsidies”, WWf Briefing 
Series, available on the Internet at: <http://www.wto.org/
english/forums_e/ngo_e/wwf_fishsubs_e.pdf> (visited 8 April 
2013): “friends of fish, which includes the United States, 
Australia, new Zealand, Chile, Iceland, the Philippines 
and Peru, argue that a reduction in subsidies could result in 
reduced over-exploitation of the marine environment, the 
removal of trade distorting subsidies, and lower government 
expenditure. The inclusion of fishing subsidies within the 
WTO has been opposed by Japan, Korea, and the eU – among 
the world’s leading subsidisers of fishing – on the grounds that 
there is no link between subsidies and over-fishing. They have 
argued that discussions should take place outside the WTO, 
particularly in the fAO. Since the Doha meeting, the eU have 
reformed their Common fisheries Policy, leaving Japan and 
Korea isolated in their opposition to the inclusion of rules on 
fishing subsidies within the WTO.”
on the high seas by creating legally binding ob-
ligations for states. This leads to renouncement 
of subsidies for fisheries in the eeZ and in this 
way, international organizations would be lim-
ited to give technical assistance to those coun-
tries that want to implement programs to re-
duce subsidies.80 In any case, if Annex VIII to 
SCM comes into force, it would improve con-
siderably the law of the sea regulation regard-
ing conservation and protection of marine life 
resources due to its insertion within the institu-
tional and substantive legal framework of WTO 
law.81
Due to the feedback between climate 
change, research of the sea and its living re-
sources as well as fisheries, the Joint norwe-
gian-Russian federation fisheries Commis-
sion in 2009 agreed to consult the 
International Council for the exploration of 
the Sea (ICeS) about possible consequences 
of climate change, including the distribution 
into the Central Arctic Ocean. Since fish 
stocks in the Atlantic Ocean are moving north 
owing to climate change,82 the ICeS Conven-
tion of 1964 pursuant to Art.2 deals with “the 
Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas and pri-
marily concerned with the north Atlantic”. It 
should be reconsidered if fish populations 
from the Atlantic Ocean continue to migrate 
to the Arctic Ocean.83 This is a clear example 
of the relevance of fisheries subsidies in the 
Arctic, as explained above. In such a case, and 
since the eight Arctic countries are ICeS 
Members,84 not only LOSC would apply re-
garding research in the Arctic. Thus, the ICeS 
Convention would also be relevant in the 
region,85 which would regulate research on a 
80 See Teijo garcía, above, at 140.
81 Since “fisheries subsidies” is not the main topic of this 
paper, to read more about it see: 
 Seung Wha Chang: WTO Disciplines on Fisheries 
Subsidies – A Historic Step towards Sustainability?, Journal of 
International economic Law 6(4), Oxford University Press, 
2003, pp. 879-921.
82 Proceedings of the International Arctic fisheries 
Symposium: Managing Resources for a Changing Arctic, 19-
21 October 2009, Hotel Captain Cook, Anchorage, Alaska, 
february 2010, at p. 2.
83 Proceedings of the International Arctic fisheries 
Symposium: Managing Resources for a Changing Arctic, 19-
21 October 2009, Hotel Captain Cook, Anchorage, Alaska, 
february 2010, at p. 28.
84 ICeS Members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, estonia, 
Finland, france, germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
the netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian 
Federation, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United 
States of America.
85 See Articles 1 and 5 of the ICeS Convention.
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higher scientific level giving as a result a 
stronger protection of fisheries in the Arctic.86 
3.4 Traffic transit 
As explained, melting in the Arctic, as a re-
sult of climate change, opens new maritime 
transit routes across the Arctic Ocean that can 
be used to improve commercial transit, to 
have faster communications and to encourage 
investment opportunities. Thus, LOSC and 
other more specific agreements, such as the 
International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), which 
the IMO supervises, regulate shipping in the 
Arctic. However, some authors are concerned 
that a dramatic increasing in shipping through 
the new routes can damage the environment; 
conversely, technological advances in mari-
time transport could improve the safety of the 
passage resulting in a routine traffic that ben-
efits world trade.87 next, the most important 
new maritime routes in the Arctic will be ana-
lyzed.
3.4.1 northwest Passage
The northwest Passage links europe and the 
Atlantic Ocean with Asia and the Pacific 
Ocean. The route is 9000 km shorter than the 
route through the Panama Canal and 17000 
km. shorter than the Cape Horn route, which 
saves time, fuel and transit fees.88 In fact, the 
northwest Passage’s deepwater route could ac-
commodate super-tankers and container ships 
that are too large for the Panama Canal.89 Thus, 
the increasing shipping traffic in this area due 
to melting has revived debate over the legal sta-
tus dispute of the northwest Passage between 
Canada, which claims that the passage lies in its 
internal waters, and the United States and the 
european Union, which argue that it is an in-
ternational strait.
86 ICeS Website: “ICeS is an intergovernmental organization 
whose main objective is to increase the scientific knowledge of 
the marine environment and its living resources and to use 
this knowledge to provide advice to competent authorities.” 
It has “almost 150 expert/Study groups that address the 
many diverse issues of the marine ecosystem.”, available on 
the Internet at: <http://www.ices.dk/explore-us/what-we-do/
Pages/default.aspx> (visited 8 April 2013).
87 James Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention and the 
Northwest Passage, The International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law, Vol.22, no.2, Koninklijke Brill nV, 2007, pp. 
257-281 at 258.
88 See Kraska, above, at 258.
89 See Byers, above, at 40.
A vast archipelago of nineteen thousand is-
lands and countless rocks and reefs that open 
several routes through Canada’s High Arctic 
make up this passage.90 However, the United 
States have always considered that the passage 
is an international strait pursuant to Art.37 
LOSC91 because it connects two expanses of 
high seas (the Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic 
Ocean) and it is used for international naviga-
tion. from this perspective, Canada owns the 
waterway and foreign vessels have a right of 
transit passage.
On the contrary, Canada considers the 
northwest Passage as internal waters, which in-
dicates that foreign vessels need Canada’s per-
mission and are subject to Canadian domestic 
law while crossing the strait. Thereby, Canada 
adopted the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Pre-
vention Act (AWPPA) imposing strict environ-
mental requirements on all shipping within 100 
nautical miles (today 200 nautical miles after 
the amendment of AWPPA in 2009, based on 
Art.57 LOSC)92 of Canada’s Arctic coast.93 The 
Canadian Act asserted the principle of interna-
tional law of maritime control within the eeZ, 
which was later recognized by LOSC. Thus, 
Art.234 LOSC could be understood as an inter-
national response to Canadian claims regarding 
Arctic waters.94 In this manner, Art.234 LOSC 
covers the northwest Passage sea traffic control 
system, with the exception of warships because 
pursuant to Art.236 LOSC, warships are not 
subject to Art.234 LOSC.95
90 Ibid., at 38.
91 Art.37 LOSC: “This section [transit passage] applies to 
traits which are used for international navigation between 
one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and 
another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.”
92 The Bill C-3 is the Act to amend the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act (AWPPA) concerning the definition of “Arctic 
waters” to extend the geographic application of the Act from 
100 to 200 nautical miles offshore Canadian land north of the 
60th parallel of north latitude. It entered into force on 11 June 
2009.
93 In 1977 Canada created, under the AWPPA, a voluntary 
maritime registration system (nORDReg) that applies to all 
ships larger than 300 tons. In spite of being a voluntary system, 
98% of all ships register under the nORDReg.
94 Anne Choquet, “Towards a common Polar navigation 
Code – When the Antarctic and the Arctic converge”, in 
Cécile Pelaudeix, Alain faure, & Robert griffiths (eds.): What 
holds the Arctic together?, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2012, pp. 123-
136 at 124.
95 See Choquet, above, at 125: “[Canada and Russia] 
concurred that the Arctic should be regarded as a special zone 
for navigation and environmental protection, in accordance 
with Article 234.”
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Together with the adoption of the AWPPA, 
Canada alleged that the straits and channels 
between the Arctic islands, including the 
northwest Passage, were Canadian historic in-
ternal waters. To support the historic claim of 
the northwest Passage, Canada based its argu-
ments on the three centuries of British explora-
tion in the area (1576-1850), which concluded 
when Britain transferred title over the archipel-
ago to Canada in 1880, excluding greenland.96 
Thus, Canada adopted legislation on whaling in 
the zone and in 1926 designed most of the ar-
chipelago as “Arctic Islands Preserve” to pro-
tect wild life and the Inuit that lived there.97
Concerning the consideration of historic in-
ternal waters it is noteworthy that, under inter-
national law, three factors are to be taking into 
account: (1) the exercise of authority over the 
area of the claiming nation; (2) the continuity 
of this exercise of authority; and (3) the acqui-
escence of foreign nations.98 Thereby, the US 
and the european Union on the grounds of the 
third factor suggest that the northwest Passage 
does not constitute Canadian internal waters.99
According to Donat Pharand,100 the main mis-
take of the Canadian “historic waters” argument 
lies in the fact that this argumentation was not 
accompanied with an explicit claim to the straits 
and channels between the islands; the United 
States always opposed the later expressions of a 
claim.101 In this regard, the strongest Canadian 
claim was based on the occupation by the Inuit, 
who are Canadian citizens settled in the Arctic 
that fished, hunted, travelled and lived on the 
northwest Passage for millennia.102 Canada used 
“straight baselines”103 to define the outer limit of 
the country’s historic internal waters on the 
96 See Byers, above, at 49.
97 Ibid., at 49.
98 Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic 
Bays, Un Doc A/Cn.4/143 (1962) at 56.
99 See Kraska, above, at 264.
100 University of Ottawa, Research, Awards and Recognition, 
Donat Pharand: “Professor emeritus of the University of 
Ottawa, he is one of the foremost experts on the international 
law of the sea, particularly as it relates to the Arctic regions. 
Thanks to his research and writings, Canadian sovereignty 
over the northwest Passage is generally accepted. He is also 
a key figure with respect to the status of french in Ontario 
schools.”, available on the Internet at: < http://www.research.
uottawa.ca/excellence-awards-recipient_228.html> (visited 
10 April 2013).
101 See Byers, above, at 50.
102 Ibid., at 50.
103 Straight baselines are lines drawn on a map between 
outer headlands or fringing islands. They are regulated by 
Art.7 LOSC. Straight baselines were employed by Denmark, 
Iceland and Russia.
grounds of the ICJ’s statement in the 1951 Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries case. The court stated, “the 
survival of traditional rights reserved to the in-
habitants of the Kingdom [of norway] over fish-
ing grounds […] founded on the vital needs of 
the population and attested by very ancient and 
peaceful usage, may legitimately be taken into 
account in drawing a line which, moreover, ap-
pears to the Court to have been kept within the 
bounds of what is moderate and reasonable.”104
However, drawing new straight baselines 
cannot close an existing international straight; 
therefore, the question is whether the north-
west Passage was an international straight be-
fore 1985.105 On the grounds of the Corfu Chan-
nel case,106 where the ICJ held that an 
international strait connects two parts of the 
high seas and international navigation uses it, it 
was clear that the northwest Passage connects 
two parts of the high seas, i.e., the Atlantic and 
Arctic Oceans. nevertheless, the phrase “being 
used for international navigation” was subject 
of concerns. The most accepted opinion to 
identify the strait as “international” is the argu-
ment based on the volume of traffic; actually 
the Corfu Channel case was a very useful route 
for ships of seven states. Thus, Donat Pharand 
could only proof sixty-nine transits in the 
northwest Passage, having obtained all foreign 
vessels prior Canadian authorization or assist-
ance.107 Accordingly, the northwest Passage did 
not fulfill the requirements of an international 
strait prior 1985. In any case, it is interesting to 
note that due to the fact that there were diplo-
matic protests regarding the drawing of the 
straight baselines; therefore, they were not 
widely recognized and there is still a possibility 
for the northwest Passage to have the status of 
an international strait if foreign ships begin 
sailing through it without Canada’s permis-
sion.108 In addition, it is no secret that US sub-
104 fisheries Case (United Kingdom vs. norway), Judgment of 
18 December 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, at 142. 
105 See Byers, above, at 54.
106 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom vs. Albania), 
Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, at 28. 
107 See Byers, above, at 55-56.
 Michael Byers, “Who owns the Arctic? – Arctic Sovereignty 
and International Relations”, Canada can help Russia with 
Northern Sea Route, The Moscow Times, 9 June 2012: 
“The United States has twice sent surface vessels through 
the northwest Passage without seeking Canada’s permission: 
the SS Manhattan, an American owned-and-registered ice-
strengthened super-tanker, in 1969; and the USCGC Polar 
Sea, a coastguard icebreaker, in 1985. [nevertheless, both 
vessels needed Canadian assistance].”
108 See Byers, above, at 56.
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marines, likely British, french and Russian sub-
marines too, have regularly used the northwest 
Passage probably without the Canadian permis-
sion.109 The fact that Canada knew the situation 
-about some of them- and kept quiet could be 
evidence that Canada has surrendered its claim 
because it would establish non-consensual us-
age of the Passage by international shipping.110
Access to the waterway for the US is not in 
fact at issue because of the security cooperation 
of both countries, namely, Canada and the US, 
in north America. Paradoxically, in spite of the 
US arguments, the recognition of the northwest 
Passage as Canadian internal waters would help 
to protect security in north America, concerning 
terrorist attacks111 or illegal entry of people and 
goods, because domestic Canadian laws would 
apply. Thus, if Canada promotes the goals of se-
curity, safe navigation and environmental pro-
tection in the Passage by applying appropriate 
jurisdiction, it would facilitate international 
widespread recognition and acceptance of the 
northwest Passage as Canadian internal waters, 
which would fulfill within the third abovemen-
tioned requirement of international law: “the ac-
quiescence of foreign nations”. Due to melting, 
it would be important a legal reconciliation be-
tween the US and Canada to build a secure and 
environmentally sustainable Arctic gateway for 
the world in the northwest Passage.112
3.4.2 northern Sea Route
The northern Sea route113 links the Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans along the eurasian conti-
nent. The route is much shorter than the alter-
native Southern Sea Route through the Suez 
Canal;114 hence, if it becomes a stable shipping 
lane, it would permit to save time, fuel – conse-
109 Ibid., at 75.
110 Ibid., at 76-77.
111 The US security interests in the Arctic have changed since 
the end of the Cold War. Thus, melting causes new security 
worries -in particular since the 9/11 attacks (2001)- due to 
the terrorist threats against north America, which would be 
best dealt with through Canadian domestic law. In fact, a new 
terrorist attack took place in the Boston Marathon on 15 April 
2013.
112 See Byers, above, at 85-87.
113 Before the 20th century, the northern Sea Route (name 
given by Russia) was called the northeast Passage (european 
name).
114 Christoph Seidler, A Navigable Arctic – Northeast 
and Northwest Passages both free of ice, Spielgel Online 
International, 28 August 2008: “The northern route is just 
7,400 nautical miles - just 40 percent of the 11,500 nautical 
mile haul through the Suez.” 
quently greenhouse gas emissions - and to carry 
more types of goods within a cheaper traffic 
transit context, due to the reduction of the ice-
breaker fees established by Russia. According 
to ACIA, summertime access to most coastal 
waters of the eurasian Arctic will be almost ice-
free within a few decades; thus, first-year ice 
will dominate this route in winter with a de-
creasing of multi-year ice in the coastal seas 
and a more extensive melting as well as more 
open water during the summer.115
Since the route runs along the Russian Arctic 
coast from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait 
and far east, Russia considers it as internal wa-
ters (Articles 8 and 50 LOSC), which means that 
states must have the Russian permission to cross 
the route, i.e., there is no right of transit passage 
for foreign ships. Russia claims jurisdiction on 
the grounds of Art.234 LOSC, which entitles 
coastal states the right to unilaterally adopt and 
enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations 
in ice-covered zones within their eeZ. Thus, in 
order to justify its claim, in 1985 the Soviet em-
bassy in Ottawa publicly supported Canadian 
claim on the northwest Passage, by saying: “[w]
hether it is the northwest Passage or the north-
east Passage does not matter. Our position is 
based on provisions of international law. 
The waters around islands belonging to a coun-
try are the internal waters of that country.”116 
However, during the Cold War there was not co-
operation on the matter between these countries 
because the United States was the most impor-
tant nATO117-ally for Canada. 
With regard to the notion of historic internal 
waters, most states have shown a general toler-
ance by means of tacit consent with the legal re-
gime settled by the Soviet Union and afterwards 
Russia, which can be observed, e.g., with the in-
ternational tacit support to the Decree of the Pre-
sidium of the Central Executive Committee of the 
USSR (1926) and nowadays with the recent Fed-
eral Law No.132-FZ on amendments to certain 
legislation of the Russian Federation regarding 
state regulation of merchant shipping in the wa-
ters of the northern Sea Route (it entered into 
115 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA): “Impacts 
of a Warming Arctic – Arctic Climate Impact Assessment”, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.116.
116 Michael Byers, “Who owns the Arctic? – Arctic Sovereignty 
and International Relations”, Canada can helpaaaas Russia 
with Northern Sea Route, The Moscow Times, 9 June 2012.
117 nATO: north Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is an 
intergovernmental military alliance based on the north 
Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949.
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force in January 2013), which defines the north-
ern Sea Route as “historical national transport 
communications of the Russian federation.” In 
this manner, the northern Sea Route fulfills with 
the three abovementioned factors of interna-
tional law to be considered Russian historic in-
ternal waters, namely, (1) the exercise of author-
ity over the area of the claiming nation; (2) the 
continuity of this exercise of authority; and (3) 
the acquiescence of foreign nations.
After the Cold War the political situation 
changed; thus, Canada and Russia decided to 
cooperate with the Arctic states. In this way, 
Russia and norway signed on 15th September 
2010 a treaty on maritime delimitation and co-
operation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic 
Ocean. On 12th May 2011 the Agreement on Co-
operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search 
and Rescue (SAR) in the Arctic was signed by 
the member states of the Arctic Council, name-
ly, Canada, Denmark, finland, Iceland, norway, 
Russia, Sweden and the United States, being the 
first binding agreement negotiated within the 
Arctic Council. This indicates that the growing 
economic importance of the Arctic region will 
have as result that the boundary issues, such as 
the northwest Passage and the northern Sea 
Route, will be solved on a peaceful and collabo-
rative basis by bilateral agreements without re-
course to dispute settlement bodies.118 
4 soveReIgnTy In THe  
aRcTIc: THe Ice-cold WAR 
WIll noT Take place
Besides the Russian and Canadian aspira-
tions, the other Arctic coastal states have also 
boundary claims: Denmark (owing to its sover-
eignty in greenland), norway (because of the 
Svalbard Island) and the United States 
(through Alaska). 
As granted by Part VI LOSC, coastal states 
may wish to expand their eeZ beyond 200 nau-
tical miles (nm) to cover the extended continen-
tal shelf; thereby, based on Art.76(8) LOSC, 
Russia submitted an official claim to the Com-
mission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
118 Thilo neumann, Norway and Russia Agree on Maritime 
Boundary in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, American 
Society of International Law, Volume 14, Issue 34, 
2010, available on the Internet at: <http://www.asil.org/
insights101108.cfm> (visited 10 April 2013).
(CLCS)119 on 20th December 2001 to establish 
the outer limit of its continental shelf beyond the 
200 nm based on the fact that the Lomonosov 
and Mendeleev ridges are natural extensions of 
the continental shelf of the eurasian continent. 
Indeed, on 2nd August 2007 Russia planted a 
Russian flag on the seafloor of the north Pole 
proclaiming symbolically (without legal validity) 
the zone to be Russian territory. Conversely, 
Russian claims could be dismissed under inter-
national law because firstly, taking into account 
Art.76(5) LOSC,120 the natural extension of the 
continental shelf may not go beyond 350 nm and 
without natural extension, the maximum width is 
300 nm. Secondly, Russian claims rights on the 
grounds of a submarine chain, but Art.76(6) 
LOSC121 states that the existence of submarine 
chains does not affect the maximum width of the 
continental shelf, i.e., 350 nm. nevertheless, it is 
important to note that the CLCS rejected the 
Russian application on 14th June 2002 because 
its claims needed further clarification, in particu-
lar regarding the Lomonosov Ridge. Thus, on 
28th february 2013 Russia submitted to the 
CLCS a partial revision of its first submission, 
which will be included in the provisional agenda 
of the thirty-second session of the CLCS in new 
York from 15th July to 30th August 2013.122
Likewise, by virtue of Art.76(8) LOSC, nor-
way submitted its claims to the CLCS on 27th 
november 2006 and the CLCS accepted them 
on 27th november 2009. The norwegian sub-
119 The CLCS is made up of scientists elected by the ratifying 
states that make recommendations based on geographic and 
geological facts. These recommendations do not concern 
overlaps between claims. In such a case, the states involved 
should negotiate a solution through agreements or referring 
the issue to an international court or arbitral tribunal.
120 Art.76(5) LOSC: “The fixed points comprising the line of 
the outer limits of the continental shelf on the seabed, drawn 
in accordance with paragraph 4 (a)(i) and (ii), either shall not 
exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 
100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a line 
connecting the depth of 2,500 metres.”
121 Art.76(6): ”notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 
5, on submarine ridges, the outer limit of the continental 
shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
This paragraph does not apply to submarine elevations that 
are natural components of the continental margin, such as its 
plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs.”
122 United nations Oceans and Law of the Sea, Division for 
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, CLCS, Outer limits 
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from 
the baselines – Submissions to the Commission: Partial 
revised submission by the Russian federation, available on 
the Internet at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
submissions_files/submission_rus_rev.htm> (visited 16 April 
2013).
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mission included parts of the Arctic Ocean sea-
bed north of the Svalbard Islands without ap-
proaching any zone that Canada could claim. 
Denmark did it concerning the Southern conti-
nental shelf of greenland on 14th June 2012, 
and Canada has still time to submit its claims 
until the end of 2013. However, the idea of di-
viding the Arctic into sectors measured by me-
ridians of longitude (sector theory)123 among 
the Arctic states can be considered erroneous 
because the Arctic sea floor is not composed of 
a physical continental shelf. Hence, the seabed, 
which is not made of an extension of the conti-
nental shelf, may not be owned.124 Accordingly, 
the sector theory can be rejected based on in-
ternational law because no Arctic coastal state 
fulfills the following requirements: (1) a coastal 
state only has full sovereignty up to 12 nm 
(Art.3 LOSC), and (2) a coastal state only has 
sovereignty over marine resources up to 200 
nm (Art.57 LOSC and Part VI of LOSC).
With regard to the United States, since it is 
not a party to LOSC,125 and accordingly Part XI 
of LOSC (The Area) and Art.76 LOSC (Defini-
tion of the continental shelf) are not rules of cus-
tomary international law, the United States will 
take into account Art.1 of the 1958 geneva Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf126 in order to 
delimit its continental shelf.127 Thus, it could be 
argued that, pursuant to Art.1 of the mentioned 
123 See the explanation of “Arctic sector” in footnote 13 of 
section II.A of this paper.
124 frédéric Lasserre: “Continental shelves and maritime 
boundaries in the Arctic – the new Cold War will not take 
place”, in Cécile Pelaudeix, Alain faure & Robert griffiths 
(eds.): What holds the Arctic together?, L’Harmattan, Paris, 
2012, pp. 107-122 at 114.
125 Clive Archer, “International and Regional Regulation 
of the Arctic – There a role for the european Union?”, in 
Cécile Pelaudeix, Alain faure & Robert griffiths (eds.), What 
holds the Arctic together?, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2012, pp. 169-
182 at 171: “The US Arctic strategy actually pointed to the 
benefits of ratification: “The Senate should act favorably on 
US accession to the Un Convention on the Law of the Sea 
promptly, to protect and advance US interests, including with 
respect to the Arctic.” [White House, 2009 C4].”
126 Art.1 of the 1958 geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf: “for the purpose of these articles, the term “continental 
shelf” is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of 
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that 
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of 
the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) 
to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent 
to the coasts of islands.”
127 Alexander n. Vylegzhanin, “economic Activities in the 
Arctic Ocean – Universal, Regional and national Regulation”, 
in Cécile Pelaudeix, Alain faure & Robert griffiths (eds.), 
What holds the Arctic together?, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2012, pp. 
137-150 at 144.
geneva Convention, the US continental shelf 
extends “to where the depth of the superjacent 
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural 
resources” of submarine areas. According to the 
US, this corresponds to more than 900 nm to the 
north of Alaska (without respecting relevant 
LOSC mechanisms) in the light of Art.1 of the 
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.128 
Besides the rejection of the sector theory, the 
scenario of a continental shelf race in the Arctic 
is not convincing because there is no need for 
that. nearly 95% of the hydrocarbon deposits 
and almost all of the mineral deposits are likely 
located in the eeZ of each Arctic coastal state; 
albeit climate change stimulates the economic in-
terests of Arctic maritime access, it does not de-
termine the schedule for submitting Arctic claims 
to the CLCS. It is a matter of time established by 
Art.76 LOSC that does not affect the state’s right 
to extend its continental shelf beyond 200 nm. 
States actively cooperate in establishing their 
claims and in their search for maritime and geo-
logical resources. Arctic states committed them-
selves within the AC context through the Ilulissat 
Declaration (2008) to accept the principles of in-
ternational law enshrined in LOSC regarding the 
definition of the limits of continental shelves, and 
on 12th May 2011, the Member states of the AC 
signed the Agreement on Cooperation on Aero-
nautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) 
in the Arctic.129 All these elements indicate that 
the outstanding maritime boundary issues will be 
solved likely through bilateral agreements among 
the five Arctic coastal states, avoiding an “ice-
cold war” and establishing a cooperation area in 
the Arctic.
5 conclusIons 
Due to climate change, the Arctic is chang-
ing from a vast ice-bound and impenetrable 
ocean to a middle sea with easier access. The 
access to the Arctic Ocean allows states to 
make research expeditions in order to extract 
natural resources, such as fish, oil, gas and min-
erals, which are located on the seabed. further-
more, there are new maritime routes that open 
the door to traffic transit and consequently fos-
ter trade, save time, transit fees and fuel, which 
reduces greenhouse gas emissions.
128 See Vylegzhanin, above, at 144.
129 See Lasserre, above, at 117-118.
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In this current situation that creates new 
challenges in international economic law, the 
Arctic coastal states submitted claims to the 
CLCS to obtain sovereignty over a portion of 
the Arctic territory, which was understood as 
the beginning of the “ice-cold war”. However, 
it has been shown that states do not need to en-
ter into a continental shelf race in the Arctic 
because the majority of the natural resources 
are located within their eeZ. Accordingly, it is 
more interesting and beneficial to encourage 
cooperation in the region, creating an “Arctic 
for everyone”.130 By means of cooperation, 
states join to obtain better and more economi-
cal results in the region concerning research, 
fisheries, extraction of oil and gas and security.
130 See Byers, above, at 127.
The CLCS has not provided recommenda-
tions for these claims yet. nevertheless, sover-
eignty and cooperation are compatible terms. 
Sovereignty facilitates cooperation providing 
clear jurisdiction that regulates traffic transit, 
the extraction of natural resources and protec-
tion against security threats.131 Cooperation is 
the key word for the Arctic region; hence, inde-
pendent of the CLCS’s recommendations, the 
main challenge for international economic law 
concerning this matter is the creation of an in-
ter-state cooperation zone that respects the 
idea of an Arctic beneficial for everyone and, as 
it was explained above (Arctic legal govern-
ance), this is already happening. 
131 See Byers, above, at 128.
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